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WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL: PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIONS
PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP (PPP) is just one name for
the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of
public services. There are many other names given to this
concept e.g. private sector participation (PSP), outsourcing,
etc.
The reasons for seeking the involvement of the private
sector in the delivery (and often the provision) of public
services can be one or more of the following:
• injection of technical/managerial expertise into the
sector, and the transfer of technological innovations;
• improvement in the economic efficiency of the sector,
in terms of both operating performance and the use of
capital investment;
• injection of large-scale investment capital into the
sector, or the creation of access to private capital
markets;
• reduction in the level of public subsidies to the sector,
and/or the redirection of these subsidies from the
groups currently served to the poor and those not
currently served;
• distancing of the sector from short-term political inter-
vention in the operation of a utility, and a reduction of
opportunities for invention by powerful vested inter-
ests;
• making the sector more responsive to consumer needs
and preferences; and
• supplementing capacity currently not available in the
public sector.
The main types of contractual arrangements between
public and private sector in the provision of water services
can be covered under the following headings:
• Service contracts
• Management contracts
• Lease contracts
• Concession contracts
• Building operate transfer/build own operate
• Divestiture
More details of each arrangement is given below:
Service contract
A service contract involves contracting out specific opera-
tions and maintenance activities to the private sector,
usually for a few years. With this approach, the public
provider sets the performance criteria for the activity,
evaluates bidders, supervises the contractor(s), and pays
an agreed fee for the services, which may be based on a
lump sum, unit cost or other basis. To achieve efficient
gains from contracting out, contracts should be awarded
through competitive bidding. Private bids can also be
compared against those of the public agency.
Management contracts
Management contracts extend the responsibility of the
private sector beyond individual service functions to en-
compass a broad scope of operations and maintenance.
Under a management contract, a private firm manages the
operations of a state owned enterprise without committing
its own investment capital or accepting full commercial
risks (although it does share some) for tariff collection or
other matters.
International experience shows that two key elements
are required for successful management contracting. First,
the contractor must be given enough autonomy to imple-
ment commercial reforms. Second, the contract must have
effective incentives for good performance, including pen-
alties for failure to meet agreed performance goals and/or
bonuses for superior performance.
Management contracts are generally for a period of five
years, but may be longer. This allows the private sector
operator to effect changes and to be accountable for
results. Management contracts are sometimes seen as an
attractive option when fuller private participation is not
appropriate, or if it is expected that a management con-
tractor can help to improve information about the enter-
prise and its market before further private participation
options are considered.
Lease contracts
Under a lease, a private firm operates and maintains a
government owned enterprise at its own commercial risk,
with income derived directly from tariffs. Except for
agreed maintenance obligations, however, the lessee has
no obligation to invest in the infrastructure. Because in
lease contracts the contractor normally finances working
capital and replacement of short-lived assets, such as small
sized pipes in the case of water supply, the duration of the
contract is usually between six and 10 years, correspond-
ing to the amortisation (write-off costs) of such works.
Leasing also therefore requires the government to com-
mit to tariffs that cover at least operating and maintenance
costs, and give the operator powerful incentives to ensure
tariffs are collected and operating costs are minimised.
Leases thus constitute a stronger form of private participa-
tion than management contracts.
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Responsibilities for operation and maintenance, on the
one hand, and for investments on the other, are conferred
on different entities but are often difficult to distinguish
unambiguously. This can lead to difficulties in coordinat-
ing investment decisions and operating needs, and the
public authority and the lessee often blame each other for
resulting performance problems.
Moreover, as the public authority retains responsibility
for financing investment, budget constraints can lead to
deterioration in the quality of the infrastructure, hindering
the performance of the operator. In these conditions, the
lessee might seek a minimum revenue guarantee that
would reduce his or her incentives to perform efficiently
and to exert pressure on the authority to adopt adequate
investment and tariff policies.
Leasing has been used for decades in urban water supply
and sewerage in France and Spain, and has also been used
elsewhere in power, ports, urban transport, railways, and
solid waste collection and disposal.
Concession contracts
Under a concession, the private operator manages the
infrastructure facility, operates it at commercial risk and
accepts investment obligations, whether they are to build
a new facility or expand or rehabilitate an existing facility.
A typical contract has a fixed term and involves transfer-
ring the assets back to the state at the end of the term.
Contracts generally run from 25 to 30 years, allowing
the private operator to recoup invested capital expendi-
ture. The concession is a common model for water supply
and treatment, ports, airports, railways, and toll roads,
when governments desire private investment but do not
wish to relinquish rights to ownership of sector assets in
the long term. Concession arrangements also exist for
solid waste disposal and treatment.
BOT/BOO
The Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) or Build-Own-Operate
(BOO) arrangement is similar to a concession for the
provision of bulk services. BOT contracts are normally
used for greenfields projects, such as a water treatment
plant, or a new wastewater treatment plant. For example,
the private sector may undertake to construct a new dam
and water treatment plant, and operate them for a number
of years. At the end of the contract, all rights to the plant
transfer back to the public utility. In this case, the govern-
ment or the distribution utility would pay the BOT partner
for water from the project, at a price calculated, over the
duration of the contract, to cover the private company’s
construction and operating costs, and provide a reason-
able rate of return. The contract between the BOT contrac-
tor and the utility is usually on a take-or-pay basis, with the
utility bound to pay for a pre specified quantity of water,
whether or not this quantity is actually demanded.
The primary advantage of BOT contracts is that they
mobilize private sector incentives, and private sector fi-
nance, for what can be very costly new investment projects.
However, many BOT contracts are not self-supporting
and cannot be financed on a limited recourse basis. They
often require the government to purchase the output in a
take-or-pay contract which is necessary for the BOT
developer to attract private capital. Unless the government
is able to make the purchase payments completely with
user fees, the payments have to be subsidised by some other
inter or intergovernmental transfer. Nevertheless, BOT
contracts can be a good way of rapidly rectifying major
supply problems.
In the BOO approach the assets remain indefinitely with
the private sector partner and thus new private entry is
permitted which may be complimentary to the existing
public provider or in competition with it.
Where a competitive entry strategy is adopted, competi-
tive pressure may help to improve the performance and
commercial outlook of the public enterprise, although in
many cases it will be difficult to establish a “level playing
field” between the public enterprise and private competi-
tors. Where a complementary entry strategy is adopted,
the demonstration effects of more efficient private opera-
tion may also influence the performance of the public
enterprise indirectly, through de facto yardstick competi-
tion.
Full or partial divestiture
Divestiture of water and sewerage utility assets can be
partial or complete. In a complete divestiture, as in a
concession, the private sector takes on full responsibility
for operations, maintenance, and investment in a utility.
Unlike a concession, a divestiture transfers ownership of
the assets to the private sector. The nature of the
public-private partnership is therefore slightly different.
Under a concession, the government has two primary
tasks: to ensure that the utility’s assets - which it continues
to own - are used well, and returned to it in good condition
at the end of the concession period; and to ensure that
consumers are protected from monopolistic pricing, or
poor service. Under the divestiture option, the private
company should, in theory, be concerned to maintain the
long-term serviceability of its asset base, so that the gov-
ernment would retain only the task of sectoral regulation.
However, it is by no means always the case that private
sector companies will take a long-term view, especially if
there is a perceived risk of asset re nationalisation at some
stage in the future - in this case, there may be a temptation
to run down assets to boost short-term gains. There is a
close relationship between asset condition, and future
service standards. Even with an asset sale, the government
(or its appointed regulator) will need to scrutinize the
utility’s asset renovation/enhancement programs. In Eng-
land and Wales, for example, regular reporting of asset
serviceability, and the monitoring of asset-related outputs
(properties subject to low pressure or supply interrup-
tions, leakage levels, sewer overflows, and failure of sew-
age treatment plants to meet emission standards) are
important elements in the regulatory process.
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Asset sales have been used widely in other infrastructure
sectors. In the water and sanitation sector, by contrast,
they have so far only been used in England and Wales.
(Chile is considering this option, and asset-owning, private
water companies have also operated for a long time in the
United States.) Given the importance of infrastructure
services to national economies, governments are unwilling
to divest themselves of these key assets without introduc-
ing safeguards against inadequate company performance.
In England and Wales, there are “safety net” powers to
appoint another operator in case of company failure. In
addition, the water companies operate under a license of
limited duration. (The initial license period was 25 years,
with the provision that, after year 15, the license could be
reviewed, and 10 years’ notice be given of the intention not
to renew the license.)
Although countries may find it politically, ideologically
or even constitutionally difficult to contemplate divesti-
ture as a potential PPP option, it should not be dismissed
without evaluation.
Divestiture (full or partial) can take three different
forms:
• sale of assets;
• sale of shares; and
• management buy-out.
There are circumstances in which any one of these three
forms may be more appropriate than a concession. First,
in a rapidly changing environment (for instance, variable
rates of urban or industrial expansion), concession con-
tracts may need frequent revisions. As these are likely to
take place without the advantage of competitive pressures,
such revisions may allow the incumbent company to gain
from superior information and bargaining power, and
could act as a disincentive to efficiency and innovation.
Under divestment, companies would need to be more
innovative and responsive to change. Second, in countries
where the existing public sector utility is technically capa-
ble, divestiture by sale of shares or management buy-out
may produce the required efficiency gains without involv-
ing the “foreign” water conglomerates that typically domi-
nate bids for concessions. This could have the advantage
of developing indigenous private sector enterprises to
work in the water and sanitation industry. (This is most
likely to be effective where local financial institutions are
well-developed.)
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Summary
Key features of the above options can be summarised in the
two tables below.
The choice of PPP involvement will depend on many
factors. In respect of the provision of water services there
has been significant opposition in many parts of the world
to the transfer of services which are genuinely regarded as
the natural monopolistic responsibility of the public sector
to the private sector.
In recent years there has been more acceptance of the
need for and the benefits of PPP with concession contracts
becoming more widely used as the vehicle.
Within the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
(DWAF) a need for some form of PPP was identified in
respect of the delivery of water and sanitation services to
the rural areas of South Africa.
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry
considerations
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry recognises
the urgent need for water and sanitation services to be
provided to rural communities.
The 1996 statistics tabulated below indicate the extent
of the backlog in provision of basic water and sanitation to
rural areas.
The Government of South Africa has formulated a
strategy for the provision of water and sanitation services
where the following policy principles apply:
• Development should be demand driven and commu-
nity based
• Basic services are a human right
• “Some for all”, rather than “all for some”
Water Supply
25 liters per person/day within 200 meters of the
dwelling (There are standards for availability, as-
surance of supply, quality and upgradeability).
Sanitation
One well-constructed Ventilated Improved Pit Toi-
let (VIP) per household.
• Equitable regional allocation of development resources
• Water has economic value
• The user pays
• Integrated development
• Environmental integrity
There are severe constraints on the delivery of services
if all needy people are to be provided with a service within
a reasonable time scale.
At the present rate of delivery i.e. that achieved in the
first three years of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP) it will take 30 to 40 years to meet the
demand for services. Politically and morally this is an
unacceptable situation and the Department of Water Af-
fairs and Forestry (DWAF) has the objectives of:
• addressing the backlog of water supply to 12 million
people within a ten year period.
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• expending R1 000 million per annum on projects to
achieve delivery.
The contract vehicle
Various contractual approaches were considered for the
provision of water and sanitation services. Of prime im-
portance to DWAF was to ensure that the selected ap-
proach could accommodate:
• the process (the “soft” issues);
• the design and construction of infrastructure (the “hard”
engineering issues).
The principles of any contract would have to acknowl-
edge, accept and accommodate the following:
• partnership between private and public sectors
• local government empowerment
• community involvement at all levels
• responsibilities identified
• flexibility cost and time controls
• Institutional and Social Development integrated with
construction and operation
long term involvement of the contractor
The responsibilities of the Contractor would include the
need to:
• mobilize communities
• establish project Steering Committee
• prepare Business Plans/Area Business Plans
• organise institutional and social development of com-
munities and operating authorities
• take responsibility for the design and construction and
operation and maintenance of the infrastructure
• organise the transfer of the projects to local authorities
• provide mentorship after handover
The solution adopted was to use the FIDIC (Interna-
tional Federation of Consulting Engineers) orange book -
Conditions of Contract for Design - Build and Turnkey
(First Edition 1995) as the base document and to modify it
to provide for the specific requirements of the particular
situation pertaining to DWAF in South Africa. This adapted
FIDIC approach is called Build, Operate, Train and Trans-
fer (BoTT).
A decision was made to introduce PPP into four of the
eight Provinces where approximately 80% of the work-
load existed i.e.:
• Eastern Cape
• KwaZulu Natal
• Mpumalanga
• Northern Province
Each Province would have its own Contractor (the
“Programme Implementation Agent” - PIA) available for
both water supply and sanitation projects and capable of
managing the entire process. One point of responsibility is
a prerogative as is the need to adequately monitor and
evaluate the progress of the PIA.
The BoTT process
DWAF put out to tender four Build-operate-Train Trans-
fer (BoTT) contracts to consortia who had pre qualified.
These contracts will be executed by the highest “points”
rated tenderers (in accordance with the published Tender
Adjudication Criteria) who on award of contract will
become “Programme Implementation Agents” (PIAs). The
BoTT contract with it’s PIA’s represent an innovative and
ambitious approach to the delivery of water supply and
sanitation services in Eastern Cape, KwaZulu Natal,
Mpumalanga and Northern Provinces. The BoTT con-
tracts are intended to accelerate delivery of the Govern-
ment’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP)
water projects. An equally important objective of the
programmes is the development of institutional capacity to
ensure that the beneficiary communities are willing and
able to commit themselves to owning, operating and
maintaining the infrastructure in the long term.
Sustainability of the endeavour will rest on this commit-
ment.
The contracts require the Programme Implementation
Agents (PIAs) to execute the following works:
• Carry out initial investigations on projects and consul-
tation with the community representatives and au-
thorities (these community representatives and au-
thorities shall be identified by the Programme Imple-
mentation Agent);
• The preparation of a Business Plan for each project;
• Obtaining approval for the Business Plan from the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. (Prior to
submitting the Business Plan to the regional office of
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry for
formal approval the Programme Implementation Agent
must ensure that the local level Project Steering Com-
mittee has recommended its acceptance);
• The preparation of an Area Business Plan for all
projects within a Planning Area;
• Obtaining approval of the Area Business Plan from the
national level of DWAF;
• Institutional and Social Development;
• Design and construction of the Project or Group of
Projects;
• Sanitation;
• Operation and maintenance of the project or Group of
Projects;
• Training of the community and Local Authorities
• Transfer of the works to the Operating Authority;
• Mentoring of the Operating Authority.
Enhancement
The scope of works for the water supply service in the
BoTT Contracts relates to the basic service RDP first phase
water provision requirement of 25 liters per day per capita
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within 200 meters. It should be noted that one of the points
considered in the adjudication was the proposals made by
the Tenderer for the facilitation of loan funding for higher
levels of service if required by the community. This would
take the form of a loan facility to finance the capital cost of
the additional requirements which would be arranged by
the Programme Implementation Agent with the commu-
nity and/or the Local Government as the borrower to-
gether with the approach to the meeting of the loan
repayment requirements.
Contractual dates
Tender documents issued: 10 February 1997
Closing date of tenders: 13 March 1997
Period of validity of tenders: 120 Calendar days
Date of expiry of tenders: 11 July 1997
Validity of contract: 24 Months from award
Contract period: (“life cycle of longest lasting Business
Plan.”)
Tender adjudication criteria document
The Evaluation Criteria were specified in the document
titled ‘Adjudication Criteria’ issued to BOT tenderers on
20 February 1997.
With the Evaluation Criteria were Bills of Quantities
which contractors were expected to price. The Bills of
Quantities were included for evaluation purposes only and
DWAF applied a number of sensitivity analyses to the
quantities - further details are to be found in the Section on
Design and Construction. The quantities in the “Evalua-
tion Bills of Quantities” represent a typical RDP workload.
The results of the sensitivity analysis were considered in
evaluating the tenderers.
The adjudication of tenders took into account the struc-
ture of each consortium to ensure that the successful
tenderer reflected the policy of the Department in terms of
PDI’s having meaningful equity in the consortium and
having a meaningful role in the management and decision
making processes.
Evaluation criteria
The evaluation took the phases of the works into account
in the following proportions:
• General document
pricing of bill of quantities 10%
• Design and construction document
pricing of bill of quantities 50%
• Organisational development and sanitation
pricing of bill of quantities 4%
assessment of the organisational development
and sanitation proposals 10%
• Operation and maintenance
pricing of bill of quantities 4%
assessment of the operations, maintenance
and transfer proposals 10%
• Previously disadvantaged individuals 12%
Assessed in accordance with definitions
formulas supplied in the DWAF “Adjudication
Criteria” document.
TOTAL 100%
Weighting
The relevant weights of the sections are as follows:
• 68 points allocated to price
• 20 points allocated to assessment of proposals
• 10 points allocated to equity ownership by Previously
Disadvantaged Individuals
• 2 points allocated to equity ownership by Women
Adjudication
Tenders were adjudicated by DWAF using a system which
awards points on the basis of:
• tendered price
• assessment of proposals
• PDI equity ownership
Contract management
The contract is between the Department of Water Affairs
and Forestry (the Employer) and the Programme Imple-
mentation Agent. The contract structure recognises the
critical role all stakeholders have to play in the provision
of sustainable systems. These other stakeholders such as
the District/Regional Councils, Local Authorities Project
Steering Committees and Labour Desk have identified
roles in the contract with the Programme Implementation
Agent and the Employer having overall responsibility.
The contract recognises the role of other stakeholders as
shown below.
To supervise, control, monitor and facilitate the work of
the PIA an Employer’s Representatives’ Team has been
established comprising typically:
• Employer’s representative (team leader)
• Site representatives
• Institutional and social development specialist
• Operations and maintenance specialist
• Sanitation specialist
Because of limitations in DWAF these positions will
initially be filled by personnel from Consulting/Manage-
ment companies.
Part of their role will be to build capacity within DWAF
so that the Department may assume the various roles.
An objective of the contract structure selected is to place
the responsibility for the execution of the projects on the
Programme Implementation Agent. The Department how-
ever recognises that it still has the overall responsibility for
the success of the projects and has therefore extended the
existing monitoring and evaluation system to meet the
particular needs of the BoTT contracts. The Department
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Water Affairs and Forestry regional offices and the Em-
ployers Representative have key roles to play in monitor-
ing the Programme Implementation Agent to ensure that
the requirements of the contract are being met. The dia-
gram below shows the structure of the monitoring and
evaluation controls. In addition to the this formal structure
there is support and monitoring at grass roots level from
the PSC and communities.
The BoTT contracts require the Programme Implemen-
tation Agent to structure activities at district council level
and at project council level in such a way as to incorporate
sound project management principles. This provides De-
partment of Water Affairs and Forestry with an additional
toll to monitor the performance of the Programme Imple-
mentation Agent as well providing a sound contractual
basis for applying the remedies in the contract should the
Programme Implementation Agent not perform.
Key Performance Indicators have been identified which
cover all phases of the project and which are linked to
project milestones i.e.:
• Business planning
• Area business planning
• Institutional and social development activities
• Design activities
• Construction activities
• Sanitation
• Operations and Maintenance
The Programme Implementation Agent is required to
report monthly against the KPI’s and these reports are
verified by the Employers Representative and by the Inde-
pendent monitors as indicated below.
The BoTT contracts require the Programme Implemen-
tation Agent to structure activities at district council level
and at project council level in such a way as to incorporate
sound project management principles. This provides De-
partment of Water Affairs and Forestry with an additional
toll to monitor the performance of the Programme Imple-
mentation Agent as well providing a sound contractual
basis for applying the remedies in the contract should the
Programme Implementation Agent not perform.
Key Performance Indicators have been identified which
cover all phases of the project and which are linked to
project milestones i.e.:
• Business planning
• Area business planning
• Institutional and social development activities
• Design activities
• Construction activities
• Sanitation
• Operations and maintenance
The Programme Implementation Agent is required to
report monthly against the KPI’s and these reports are
verified by the Employers Representative and by the Inde-
pendent monitors as indicated below.
Current status
• The Employer has issued contract sub-clause 8.1.1
Notices to the four PIAs together with lists of projects
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to be implemented. These notices are similar to the
normal contract “Commencement Notice”.
Approximately projects with budgets totalling R500
million have been identified as being suitable to be
undertaken by the PIA and planning work is actively
underway.
• The true test of success of the BoTT initiative can only
be measured long after handover of the assets to the
operating authority. If the infrastructure is sustainable
then much will have been accomplished.
• Value for money can be tested but this will be imprecise
because of the additional requirements for ISD and
O&M to ensure sustainability.
• Much will be learned from the process and perhaps the
next round of BoTT will introduce more elements into
the public private partnership arrangement.
Questions will be raised as to whether private finance
can be used to find infrastructure and whether there
may be commercial business opportunities for the
private sector in the operation and maintenance and
cost recovery of completed infrastructure.
• BoTT is viewed as an alternative and additional mecha-
nism to achieve delivery of water and sanitation serv-
ices to the needy rural areas.
With a true partnership approach it is believed that
BoTT can be a success story - all the players are hard
at work to ensure success.
